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mental disability rights organizations are going to have to take a stand on
international human rights. Human rights organizations are going to have to
take a stand on disability rights. We have to establish new alliances bring out
best allies on board first. Only then can we get governments to back up the
convention.
Unfortunately, we are in a particularly difficult situation her in the United
States. The United States government is one of the most conservative governments in the world when it comes to international conventions. It is very hard
to get United States government support for any international conventions.
Yet, ironically, we have the strongest disability rights movement in the world.
We have the best organization. We have got very good legislative models and
legal precedent. We have invaluable experience on which to draw.
In Western Europe, disability activists look to the United States with
great admiration. Even though much of Western Europe has better social service models than the United States, there are very few countries with better
laws. The Americans with Disability Act is an international inspiration. Now,
as long as the United States government does not stand in the way of a new
convention, activists in the United States have an opportunity to build on our
experience and shape the new legal regime.
Now is our opportunity to be integrated in the world disability rights
community and to participate in furthering international law. But we can only
do so if we take a stand on these rights. I encourage all of you to get involved
as lawyers and as activists. If you are a part of organizations that can weigh-in
with a significant US constituency, you have your work cut out for you. This
is true even if your networks are not international and you have never done
international work before. Organizing to gain support for a convention is your
chance to make a difference for people with mental or physical disabilities
around the world.
Thank you.
V.

BRIDGING THE GAP:

AMERICAN AND OTHER PERSPECTIVES

MR. DUBINSKY*: I am Paul Dubinsky and I am on the faculty here. I
teach international law and international human rights in general. "Bridging
the Gap American and Other Perspectives," is the name of our last panel.
I admire Professor Perlin enormously. There is a movement against torture and interrogation. Once you get to the point where you are ready to put
pen to paper and are ready to draft laws and mechanisms, then it becomes
interesting and complicated. You quickly find that there is one set of rights
that potentially conflict with another set of rights, and that maybe the institu* Yale, B.A. 1985 summa cum laude; Harvard, J.D. 1989 magna cum laude (Law Review); Katholieke Universiteit (Leuven, Belgium) 1991 LL.M. magna cum laude, Belgian-
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tions that exist to protect the rights generally don't protect the rights that you
are concerned about right then and a lot of hard thinking has to be done. What
Michael did was assemble a terrific panel of four people with very different
perspectives meant to shed some light on the complexities ahead.
I put the speakers in an order that is theoretical and practical, and allows
us to consider both at the same time. Our first speaker should give us a chance
to think about it intensely. Ginger Lerner-Wren is a judge in Broward County.
As has already been mentioned, she presides over the fairly specialized court
dedicated to the diversion and treatment of the mentally ill in the criminal
justice process and I hope she will tell us how that works.
A.

Court Systems Perspectives

JUDGE LERNER-WREN*: First of all, good afternoon. I want to let
you all know what a privilege and honor it is to be here this afternoon. I
cannot tell you how impressive it is to be in this law school. I have spoken in
a number of law schools, both in and outside the State of Florida, and none,
quite frankly, have impressed me like this particular institution with regard to
its dedication to persons with disabilities and human rights. What an honor it
is to be here this afternoon listening to our speakers.
I want to take a moment, as all of the speakers have, to thank Professor
Perlin for inviting me. Approximately five years ago, I called Professor Perlin
out of the blue. I told him that I am a criminal court judge down in Fort
Lauderdale, and was thinking of starting a particular kind of court that apparently is something prototypical and has never been done before. There were
many legal, social, philosophical, and political issues that we really needed to
navigate, and I asked Professor Perlin if he would guide me with his expertise
on constitutional dimensions and designs that this court would have to face
and how to deal with that. And, of course, not knowing him then, but knowing
him now, his generosity was incredible.
We spoke briefly about the objectives and the goals of our mental health
court, which now has come into being and has gained attention nationally.
Professor Perlin should take a great deal of credit for this particular strategy.
He was really so helpful with regard to constitutional issues that I think we
needed to think about before we began to act.
I also want to take a moment to thank Professor Bruce Winick, because
he is in the area of therapeutic jurisprudence, which the mental health court
wholly adopted in its judicial proceedings. Professor Winick also generously
* Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren was elected Broward County Court Judge, Florida, in 1997
and assigned to the criminal bench. In June of that year, Judge Lerner-Wren was appointed by
the Chief Judge of her Circuit to preside over the nation's first specialized court dedicated to the
rapid and safe diversion and treatment of the mentally ill arrested on low level misdemeanor
offenses. The Court was specially designed to improve the administration of justice for those
with severe mental disabilities and to generally promote decriminalization of the mentally ill.
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gave his time and expertise, and I hope that I follow the theory of therapeutic
jurisprudence every day in my court.
I would like to open my discussion on a question: Why is a domestic
county criminal court judge included in a high-level, sophisticated international symposium on human rights? In response to this question, I would like
to speak in terms of some of the observations that I made from our early
morning panelists. We have a great deal to be embarrassed about in Florida,
which is one of the lowest funded states in the area of social services, generally. I am not talking about the mentally ill, but the developmentally disabled
generally across the board. Florida is simply behind.
Florida is one of the fastest growing states in the country. Our population
is complex and fragile. We have a tremendous demographic growth in the
area of our elderly. We have no guardianship services of which to speak, and
no juvenile justice services. We have six federal class actions with regard to
our foster care system. It is grim. It is desperate.
So why am I here today? I am formerly an attorney with our state's
protection and advocacy system known as the Advocacy Center for a Person
with Disabilities, which is what it is known as in our state. I come from a civil
rights consumer oriented background, number one. Number two, I do have
somewhat of a wide array of experience in the investigation of abuse and neglect. I have investigated countless incidents of abuse and neglect, primarily
affecting disabled or elderly and have monitored and/or reviewed probably
every kind of living facility institution, hospital, psychiatric unit. I am struck
this morning between the observations described this morning in Hungary and
in Eastern Europe, and what we have to live and deal with every day in the
State of Florida.
In terms of societal homes, we do not have cages. Professor Perlin spoke
this morning in terms of where we have come in this country in the area of
civil rights, in the area of landmark court rulings, and the simple fact that
rarely, if ever, every single day the spirit of decisions in civil and criminal law
trickle down. For example, of the right to refuse treatment - and I am speaking at this point from a judicial perspective combined with my experience of
civil rights work - has been distorted. It is distorted every single day in the
real world, in real life, and the issues of pretext, and the issues of what really
happens in a court of law.
I am going to be talking from a criminal justice standpoint, not civil. I do
no voluntary civil commitments work. From a criminal perspective, it is my
opinion that we are not in a good place in this country. Even with thirty years
of maturity, and landmark constitutional decisions, we find ourselves in very,
very desperate straits.
To watch the mental health court speak in the same voice of those who
care desperately for our citizens, who are literally transfer institutionalized, I
think we ought to talk about it. I think if we learn anything from what has
happened in this country, maybe what is going to happen then in terms of
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reform on an international and human rights front, it becomes very important
to learn that as we reform institutions and as we move people out of institutions we do not create what has happened in this country. That is, criminalization of the disabled and mentally ill, because this has had some tragic
consequences. In the Department of Justice survey that came out in 1999,
sixteen percent of the prisoners in each individual county jail suffer from a
major mental illness.
My county jail was and is the largest de facto psychiatric institution in
our community. If you know what happens in terms of medical services and
psychiatric treatment provided in the jails, it is marginal at best. In my county,
we have a new medical service provider, and so far the services are leading a
legacy nothing short of catastrophic. Five years ago in our community, our
stakeholders went through a confluence of events. There were tragic deaths in
the jail. The grand jury was assembled to investigate the lack of services in
our community. We had a jail consent decree so that there could not be over a
certain capacity of population in the county jail without us being fined. There
was a rather high-profile case involving a young man who suffered a very
significant brain injury that left him psychiatrically disabled.
All of these influences came together, and we had a task force of our
prosecutors, public defender's office, judges, and community consumers.
They came together for the very meaningful purpose of finding a local strategy
in order to streamline the criminal justice system and address the complexities
of individuals with mental disabilities and mental retardation. Even our elderly get arrested all the time for various things, some of them silly.
The task force tried to identify ways in the system to better address this
very special population and improve the administration of justice. Ultimately,
it was a chief public defender, a wonderful, charismatic, media savvy, public
defender, who said, we want a specialty court. With that, a consensus was
born.
I happened to run for my judicial seat and when I came on board I was
asked by our chief judge to serve in this wonderful role as presiding over a
specialized court that would basically do two very simple things: Find a staff
- because this is a post-booking strategy - and find internships as rapidly as
possible. This court is for those individuals entering the jail system on low
level, quality of life kind of offenses that people just revolve in and out.
First, we get to the ones who are acutely ill, the most ill, move them
rapidly from one inhumane system, that being the jail system, into a more
humane system of treatment and care (that being stabilization), receiving unit
hospitals for a community based system of treatment. But the idea was to find
the sickest of the sick, those that are really ill entering the jail system, those
who should not have entered the jail system at all, quite frankly, for the most
part.
So back around five years ago, we decided to go ahead and begin this
specialty court, but, of course, the constitutional issues, legal issues, political
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issues, and philosophical balancing that had to take place was a very serious
matter. The court euphemistically has been referred to as many things, like a
problem solving court or a treatment court. Some of the other judges who are
not very sympathetic toward this population, have called the court some not
very nice things.
One of the truly enlightening principles of this court was really one of
conscience driven by human rights and human rights alone. If you look at a
court from this vantage point knowing a few things, and you make a few
presumptions, it is that the people that you are going to be seeing, number one,
historically are known to have been abused, neglected, maltreated, and/or dehumanized. So that is the energy and the presumptions with which this court
starts out.
Several things guide the court, which is part-time. One is that the court is
purely voluntary. Nobody has to utilize and/or gain the benefits or services of
this court unless you want to. I also have a regular traditional court and docket
that I handle. I do no civil commitment from the court. So I did not want to
inherently conflict with any substantive due process issues, and the court defies a whole therapeutic approach.
What does that mean, and how does that implement and apply to the
court? We begin with the presumption that individuals with serious mental
illness who have been in the streets receiving facilities, who have not been
abused and neglected, have most likely never come before an empathetic
judge or court process that gives them a safe-haven with a tone of dignity.
The tone in the court is always one of respect, and we use nothing but
strength-based language. We immediately set the tone that we understand the
challenges of what the individuals have gone through, whether they are homeless or not homeless.
We talk about the choices that this court offers. Everything that is done
in the court is designed to decriminalize. That is very, very important. Some
of the key features of the court are as follows: Everything is done on a pretrial basis. Probation is not, or is rarely, used. We use the court to rapidly
divert. For those that we may be following in the court in terms of trying to
gain community based services, which in Florida we have very little of, we use
the court to help hold this community-based delivery system accountable to
the individual, as well as the individual being accountable to treatment. But
more than likely it is the community treatment providers that need to be held
accountable.
If you were trying to use your HMO and you had a judge overseeing your
health care delivery, would that help? It helped a lot! Even though I do not
have jurisdiction over providers, it is a blessing what influence the court has
on the effectiveness of treatment, appointments, and services for those who
need it, want it, and are utilizing the court to get it. The court takes a therapeutic approach, not a punitive approach, and everything that is done in the
court is done from a psychiatric, rehabilitative basis, meaning that there is a
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feeling of self-determination and empowerment. Having a mental health condition is no different than having to take heart medication or having high blood
pressure. Everything that is said in the court is done to help individuals know
that their symptomatology is not who they are as a person.
We feel very bad for what has happened to these individuals in the course
of their lives. The court is clearly, deeply immersed in terms of human rights.
I dare say that the court is one that is one based on inhuman rights. Whether
or not it is appropriate for judges to develop such courts, I do not know, but I
think it is.
I am going to end my speech by thanking all of you today, and asking
that the criminalization issue of individuals that somehow were arrested may
be legally sanctioned and legally deemed as okay. It is not okay. An artificial
boundary between individuals who are committed and experiencing abuses in
some kind of assisted living facilities or caged in jail are psychotic and cannot
get treatment and languishing because the justice system is not designed effectively to deal with this population and really does need to be addressed at all
levels. We are very proud of our court. It has great promise. We acknowledge its limitations purposefully. The limitations are in order to protect and
preserve those individual rights, but it has in our county and in our community
made an unbelievably significant difference. I thank Professor Perlin for all of
his expertise and for help in designing such a court, and I thank you all for
having me.
MR. DUBINSKY: Thank you, Judge Lerner-Wren.
You refer to therapeutic jurisprudence and we are very fortunate to have
one of the country's foremost scholars in that field. Bruce Winick has a been
Professor of Law at the University of Miami School of Law in Coral Gables,
Florida, where he has taught since 1974. He is co-founder of the school of
social enquiry known as therapeutic jurisprudence.
Professor Winick is the author, co-author and co-editor of numerous
books, the latest of which are PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW
AS A HELPING PROFESSION and THE ESSENTIALS OF FLORIDA MENTAL HEALTH

LAW. He has also authored over seventy-five articles in law reviews and interdisciplinary journals. Professor Winick has received numerous awards, including the Thurgood Marshall award of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York and the Human Rights Award of the American Immigration
Lawyers Association.
In an earlier life he was Director of the Court Mental Health Services for
the City of New York and General Counsel to the New York City Department
of Mental Health and Mental Retardation Services.
Professor Winick.
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B.

Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives

PROFESSOR WINICK*: Whenever I come to New York Law School
and Michael does invite me here from time-to-time - I regard it as a bit of
a homecoming. I worked at 93 Worth Street, about a block from here, when I
was General Counsel of the New York City Department of Mental Health.
The work that I did in those days introduced me to mental health law, and
sparked an interest that I have pursued in my teaching and scholarship ever
since.
Michael has asked me to present a therapeutic jurisprudence perspective
on the papers that we have heard today. Before doing so, let me explain the
concept of therapeutic jurisprudence.
It is an interdisciplinary field of scholarship that examines the law's impact on emotional life. The field was co-founded by Professor David Wexler
of the University of Arizona College of Law and the University of Puerto Rico
School of Law and myself almost 15 years ago. It grew out of our individual
scholarship in the area of mental health law. In addition to case examination,
statutory construction, and constitutional analysis, our articles used insights
from the social sciences to critique the legal issues under consideration. Ironically, mental health law, which was designed to help those with mental illness,
often produced anti-therapeutic consequences, causing them to behave dysfunctionally in a number of ways. In the late 1980s, we came to call this style
of scholarship "therapeutic jurisprudence."
The insight underlying therapeutic jurisprudence is fairly simple. The
law is a social force that has certain inevitable consequences, including consequences for people's mental health. The law, of course, has effects in a variety
of Spheres. It has economic effects, environmental effects, and consequences
for public safety. In addition, law has an important impact on the emotional
well-being of the people it touches. Our take was that we should study this
impact. The people in the law and economics field counsel us to study the
economic impact of law. We suggested that we should study the therapeutic
impact of law - the rules of law themselves, legal practices, and the way law
is applied by various legal actors like judges, lawyers, police officers, and
expert witnesses testifying in court. Therapeutic jurisprudence thus calls for
an interdisciplinary examination of law that uses the tools of the behavioral
sciences to probe law's consequences in this area. It also is a law reform
movement, suggesting that law should be reshaped to diminish its anti-therapeutic consequences, and when consistent with other important legal values, to
-

* Bruce J. Winick is Professor of Law at the University of Miami School of Law in Coral
Gables, Florida, where he has taught since 1974. He is co-founder of the school of social
enquiry known as therapeutic justice. Professor Winick is the author, co-author, and co-editor
of numerous books. Professor Winick has received numerous awards, including the Thurgood

Marshall Award of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the Human Rights
Award of the American Immigration Lawyers Association.
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maximize its therapeutic potential. In short, therapeutic jurisprudence sees the
law as a healing force.
The field of therapeutic jurisprudence has grown substantially since its
origins in mental health law, and now has spread across the legal landscape,
emerging as a mental health approach to law generally. The approach has
been used to examine issues in juvenile law, family law, health law, bankruptcy law, contracts and commercial law, tort law, evidence law, and in a
variety of other areas.
What can therapeutic jurisprudence contribute to our understanding of the
issues we have been discussing today? Let us examine this area of the law
through the lens of therapeutic jurisprudence. This morning, we have heard a
sorry tale about the state of mental health law in Eastern Europe. We have
heard about locked bed cages. We have heard about abusive use of modified
electroconvulsive therapy. We have heard about isolation of patients in overcrowded shelter care facilities located in rural areas, thereby preventing them
from interacting with people in the community from which they come. We
have also heard about guardians, who instead of promoting the best interests of
their wards, admit them to these isolated social care facilities on a so-called
"voluntary" basis, where they are largely forgotten. Let us think about what
message these practices give to people suffering from mental illness, and what
the impact of that message is on their emotional well-being.
Eric Rosenthal mentioned that in Hungary and perhaps in other eastern
European nations, there are no laws governing the use of seclusion and restraints in mental health facilities. Let me point out that no law is law. The
omission of a prohibition or limitation on seclusion and restraint, as well as on
the use of bed cages or unmodified ECT for punishment, stands as an authorization for the use of these practices. After all, if government officials subjected people who do not have mental illness to these practices, they would be
committing criminal offenses, or at the very least, torts. We simply can't lock
people up in cages, or subject them to unmodified ECT, which sounds like
torture. So the absence of a prohibition in these countries on the use of these
practices in effect is a law, and one that not only raises serious legal questions,
but is strongly anti-therapeutic.
Singling out people with mental illness for these abusive practices can be
seen as an example of what Michael Perlin has called "sanism" and "pretextuality," a deep-seated discrimination against people who are mentally ill that
allows us to see them, in a way, as outside the protection of the law.
The general treatment of people will mental illness we have heard about
today makes me think about the plight of Joseph K, the lead character in
Frantz Kafka's novel The Trial. Kafka, himself an Eastern European, paints a
frightening picture of the absurdity of modem life. The predicament of modem man is illustrated by Joseph K, a common man who is caught up in the
intricacies of the legal system. He is arrested, but remains uncertain as to the
charges. He does not understand why he is being treated in the way that he is.

2002]

SYMPOSIUM

405

He tries to deal with the legal proceedings, but it is all an absurd predicament.
He can't make heads or tails of it. The legal system seems to make little
sense. At the end of the book, he turns a corner and is accosted by several
men, who without discussion, proceed to slit his throat. His dying words are,
"Like a dog."
This is what we do to those with mental illness in Hungary and other
Eastern European nations. We are treating them in a dehumanizing way, and
the law, by its silence, is authorizing it. When we lock people in small cages,
or subject them to electric shocks to punish them, we are treating them like
dogs. It all makes me think of the work of American psychologist Martin
Seligman. Seligman's research with dogs and other animals provides considerable insight about the psychological consequences of subjecting people to
these kinds of practices. Seligman's early experiments involved subjecting
dogs to electric shocks (unmodified ECT) that they were powerless to avoid.
Whatever the dogs did, they could not escape the shocks, which were administered on an intermittent basis with no particular pattern. They reacted by giving up, falling to the floor and remaining in a motionless state. Unable to
control what was happening, they reacted with helplessness, inaction, and
surrender.
Out of this early work with animals, and eventually with humans, Seligman developed his theory of learned helplessness. The theory posits that when
people are deprived of a serious degree of control over significant events in
their lives, they acquire a behavior pattern that involves feelings of helplessness, hopelessness, and despair. They become amotivational, unwilling to set
goals or to attempt to achieve them. They act in ways that mirror clinical
depression. They essentially give up on life.
One of Seligman's experiments involved baby rats held in the experimenter's hand. No amount of squirming or other behavior would succeed in
allowing them to escape from their human cage. After a period of such imprisonment, the rats were dropped into a vat of water, where they quickly sank
to the bottom and drowned. A control group of rats not subjected to the hand
caging procedure also were dropped into vats of water, but they were able to
swim and survived for up to 24 hours before drowning. From this experiment,
Seligman drew the conclusion that the sense of helplessness that those rats had
acquired as a result of their squirming behavior quickly generalized to swimming. Animals, and by extension people, who experience helplessness in one
area of their lives soon feel helplessness in all other areas of their lives.
Let me suggest that what is being done to people with mental illness in
certain Eastern European nations is likely to produce the syndrome of learned
helplessness in those subjected to it. The bed cages bear an uncanny resemblance to the experimenter's hands that served to imprison the baby rats in
Seligman's experiment. The unmodified ECT they are subjected to as punishment resembles the electric shocks administered to the dogs in Seligman's
early experiments. People treated in this manner are likely to function in a
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way that resembles clinical depression. They just don't care. They learn that
nothing they can do will matter, so why bother to do anything. They predictably will lose interest in life, becoming mired in feelings of helplessness and
hopelessness. They will be deprived of the feeling of self-esteem and selfefficacy that may be essential to psychological well-being. Thus, what we are
doing to people in a mental health system that treats them in the way we have
heard about this morning is psychologically damaging in a number of respects.
We are producing learned helplessness and a form of depression that will interfere with their functioning. In short, we are literally making them mentally
ill. Even if not mentally ill before, this treatment will predictably make them
function as though they are mentally ill.
Once we understand the strong anti-therapeutic consequences of these
legal arrangements, the need to dismantle them will become manifest. Not
only do they violate basic principles of human dignity and morality, but they
are psychologically damaging in ways that can be seriously harmful. Moreover, unlike torture and imprisonment applied as punishment to those who
might be political enemies of a particular regime, treatment of this kind delivered for putatively benevolent purposes constitutes a mixed message that can
produce or exacerbate mental illness. The absence of legal protections against
these practices in Hungary and other Eastern European nations must be ended.
International Human Rights law and domestic law should be developed in a
way that puts an end to these practices and treats people as human beings.
Beyond changing the law, what other remedies does therapeutic jurisprudence suggest we might adopt to ameliorate these problems? One of the first
people from the audience to take the microphone this morning was Dr. Levine,
a psychotherapist. She told us that she treats people with schizophrenia without administering medication. She described her powerful insight that people
treated in certain ways will behave in a certain predictable manner. People
placed in concentration camps, she noted, will acquire certain predictable behavior patterns, will develop certain inevitable warps in their personalities,
will suffer from continued anxiety and depression, and will exhibit other
symptoms of mental illness. Just as people subjected to concentration camps
will have a predictable psychological syndrome, so will people treated in the
ways we have heard about this morning. What is the remedy for this? Dr.
Levine told us that in her treatment of patients, she tries hard to see the humanity of the people she treats. She is able to look past the symptoms of their
mental illness and see the human being and deal with that human being. She
is able to forge an emotional bond with her patients, treating them with dignity, respect, and empathy. Let me suggest that one of the remedies for the
practices in Eastern Europe we have heard about this morning is therapists like
Dr. Levine.
Another remedy for these practices is to have judges like Judge LernerWren. Judge Lerner-Wren treats the people in her courtroom with dignity and
respect. She displays a high degree of empathy for the patients she en-
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counters, and offers them help on a voluntary basis. She gives them choices
rather than coercing them. Judge Lerner-Wren understands that people need
choices. They need to be self-determining, and if we deprive them of the
ability to make choices for themselves, they ultimately will become even more
ill. Judge Lerner-Wren understands that judicial processes that rely on coercion often are ineffective. People coerced into doing things may go through
the motions, but are unlikely to experience any real or continued attitudinal or
behavioral change. For example, people in traffic court who are required to go
to driving school will do so in order to avoid points on their license, which
will increase their insurance rates. But what real benefit do they experience.
Many go to driving school and fall asleep, or laugh it off. Many people sent to
driving school will not get anything out of it. In order to succeed in helping
them to change their antisocial behavior, we need to engage their intrinsic
motivation. They have to understand for themselves that they have a problem
and see the value in dealing with it. They must understand that there are ways
of dealing with their problems and that they are capable of succeeding if they
try. This is what Judge Lerner-Wren does for the people in her courtroom.
She offers a helping hand and directs them towards resources in the community. She opens up doors for them, but does not push them through those
doors. Rather, she invites them to help themselves. She gives them choices
and treats them as human beings. She gives them an opportunity to be selfdetermining, and to help them selves. And she does it with dignity and respect
for their humanity. That is the path to recovery. We thus need therapists like
Dr. Levine and judges like Judge Lerner-Wren.
We also need lawyers like some of the lawyers we have heard from this
morning. We need lawyers like Eric Rosenthal and tva Szeli. We need lawyers who care about their clients and who practice law with an ethic of care.
We need lawyers who seek to protect their clients, but who do not suffocate
them. We need lawyers who listen to their clients, like Judge Lerner-Wren
listens to the people in her courtroom. We need lawyers who make their clients understand that they are their allies, their guardians, and their champions.
They must accord them a sense of voice and validation, and respect the
choices that they make. They must allow their clients the opportunity to tell
their stories and to be listened to. We all need that. When we have endured
some horrible thing in our lives, we need to talk about it with someone who is
going to listen and be empathetic and understanding. We need lawyers who
act as Judge Lerner-Wren acts in the courtroom, lawyers who can listen to
their clients and take them seriously as persons.
A body of research on the psychology of procedural justice confirms the
value of having therapists, judges, and lawyers who truly care about the people
they work with, who listen to them, and who take them seriously. This research examined how people feel about their participation in judicial and administrative hearings of various kinds. People highly value voice, the ability
to tell their story, and validation, the feeling that what they have had to say
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was taken seriously by the judge or hearing examiner. They also greatly value
being treated with dignity and respect, fairness, and in good faith. People who
are treated this way at hearings experience significantly greater satisfaction,
and comply more readily with the decision reached, even if adverse to them.
These conclusions are particularly significant for people with mental illness
when the hearing in question seeks to mandate hospitalization or treatment.
Although many in this category may resist these interventions, if they are
treated in ways that fulfill these participatory or dignitary values, they predictably will be more satisfied with the hearing they are given and more likely to
accept the outcome. When that outcome is mandated hospitalization or treatment, this means that they are more likely to participate in it in ways that
might increase the effectiveness of the treatment they are given. By contrast,
those who feel that they are not treated in these ways, are likely to be less
compliant with the court's order and less likely to gain the benefits of
treatment.
This research has obvious implications for how judges in civil commitment and related proceedings should behave. But it also has important implications for how lawyers counseling clients in these contexts should act, and for
how therapists who treat them should relate to their patients. All of these legal
actors should treat them with dignity and respect, seeking to convey to them
the sense that they have their best interests at heart and truly wish to help
them. This explains why judges like Judge Lerner-Wren, lawyers like Eric
Rosenthal and tva Szeli, and therapists like Dr. Levine are what is needed to
remedy the kinds of abuses we have heard about in Eastern Europe.
In addition, we need professors like Michael Perlin. It is wonderful to be
here at New York Law School, where Michael has spent so much of his professional career. He first, of course, was a practicing lawyer in New Jersey,
where he was one of the key architects of that state's pioneering program
providing legal services to those with mental illness. Both in his legal practice
and in his years teaching here at the New York Law School, Michael has
inspired several generations of lawyers, many of whom are here, to practice
law with an ethic of care. This is what we really need in lawyers practicing in
this area, indeed, in all lawyers. This is what we really need in our law professors - professors who inspire their students to go out and do good.
What are the remedies for the problems we have heard about this morning? Therapeutic jurisprudence suggests that we need new laws, but more
than new laws, we need to change the way people function within the legal
system. We need to instill in our judges, our lawyers, and our therapists a real
sense of caring, of love, really. You know, in an earlier time, these kinds of
problems involving people with mental illness would have been dealt with by
the family and by the community. In those days, no one was dispensable.
When we lived in small hunting and gathering tribes, or tiny villages, everyone was needed to do the work of the community. We could not afford to
ostracize those who, in one way or another, were deviant. We could not afford
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to send them off to some faraway facility in the countryside. They were
needed to harvest crops, to mend fences, to hunt, to prepare the food, and to
care for the children. Because they were essential to the life of the community, when they had a problem, we needed to pull together to solve that problem and somehow bring them back into the fold. In those early days,
problems of this kind would be dealt with through love and understanding.
Unfortunately, however, we seem to have lost that sense of community.
With industrialization and the rise of the city, life has become impersonal and
disconnected. We live in little cubicles, in apartment buildings, and scarcely
know our neighbors. Families are scattered, and communities lack the sense
of cohesiveness and relatedness that once characterized the way we lived.
That is what is wrong with the modem world. We need to be more caring for
those who need help. People with mental illness are human beings, and we
need to see their humanity and reach out to them. And we need to do it not
with the heavy-handed coercion of the law, but with the kind of love a parent
would give a child, a brother a brother. We need to provide needed services,
and persuade our fellow human beings of their value, rather than coerce them.
We need to do this out of a sense of caring, and I submit that this is the remedy
that therapeutic jurisprudence would commend to you for the kinds of
problems we are hearing about, both internationally and domestically. We
need to export to Eastern Europe the role models for lawyers, judges, and
therapists that we are seeking to shape here - the kinds of lawyers that Eric
Rosenthal and ltva Szeli represent, the kinds of judges that Judge Lemer-Wren
represents, and the kinds of therapists that Dr. Levine represents. We need to
sensitize lawyers, judges, and clinicians in Eastern Europe to the fact that the
way they play their roles has inevitable consequences for the people in their
care. We need to teach these legal actors that they are therapeutic agents, and
that they should play their roles therapeutically rather than antitherapeutically.
Thank you very much.
MR. DUBINSKY: Thank you.
Robert Dinerstein is a Professor of Law and Associate Dean at American
University, Washington College of Law. He has written several articles about
a lot of different things, various topics, including civil rights policy, clinical
legal education, and civil rights. He has delivered numerous speeches and
presentations on the Americans with Disabilities Act and other disability issues and on clinical legal education. Professor Dinerstein was a member of
the Clinton Transition Team, Department of Justice, Civil Rights Cluster in
1992 and was appointed by President Clinton to the President's Committee on
Mental Retardation in 1994. Professor Robert Dinerstein.
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GuardianshipReform Perspectives

PROFESSOR DINERSTEIN*: Thank you, Paul.
We are at New York Law School at a conference that Michael Perlin is
doing so I must quote Bob Dylan; the title of my speech is, "I was so much
older then, I'm younger than that now," from Dylan's "My Back Pages."
I am going to be talking about some general principles of guardianship
with a sense of how guardianship works and does not work and try to link it to
some problems observed in Hungary.
I was fortunate to attend the mission that MDRI had in Hungary in 1997,
the results of which are explored in Human Rights and Mental Health: Hungary.3 I should disclose that I am chairman of the MDRI board, so I am not
completely objective about its work. However, while I did go to Hungary in
1997, I was not part of the mission that updated the 1997 report.
I think being on a panel like this is interesting in that you are sitting there
trying to think about how what you will say might possibly relate to people
who you are following, and assuming that people come after you have their
own issues to address. You start listening to what people are saying and how
it might connect to what you will say. Where Bruce ended up is a pretty good
segue to what I want to talk about, which concerns choices, and another aspect
of choices, which is dealing with people on the basis of consent.
If there is anything that we know is critical about the problems that
guardianship practices have caused, it is that sometimes out of an excessive
desire to protect people, we have systematically taken away their opportunity
to make choices about their lives and sometimes we did that with the best of
intentions. We dealt with people who did not have the capacity to make
choices on their own, so we needed intervention to assist them. But in assisting them we took an all or nothing approach, historically, and said, you don't
get to choose any more; you don't get to vote, sign contracts, marry. You are
effectively a non-person.
While most people understand the human rights problems inherent in the
Hungarian practice of using cages in social care homes, in the United States,
our approach to guardianship continues to reflect too much of an all-or-nothing approach. So while it is not putting a human being in a cage, it may be
more of a human rights violation, to believe that he is a non-person, that nothing he says or does makes a difference. Think about that.
* Robert D. Dinerstein is a Professor of Law and Associate Dean at American University,
Washington College of Law. Professor Dinerstein has authored several articles on clinical education, civil rights policy, and human rights. He has delivered numerous speeches and presentations on the American with Disabilities Act and other disability issues and on clinical legal
education. Professor Dinerstein was a member of the Clinton Transition Team, Department of
Justice, and Civil Rights Cluster in 1992. He was appointed by President Clinton to the Presi-
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It is a very powerful concept when we as employers and law students and
other professionals are imbued with the idea that we can make a difference in
the world and know that we can go to court and ask a judge to do something
and participate in the system. We may not have our way, but we will have the
right to get people to listen to us. But when you have a guardian "volunteer"
you into an institution, we cannot say that it is your choice. That means that
you are a non-person.
The barbaric practices of electroconvulsive treatment ("ECT") without
sedation, suturing without anesthesia, is unfortunately still very common for
people with mental retardation. Some doctors in Pennsylvania said two or
three years ago, "We did not realize they could feel pain." You cannot come
to those kinds of conclusions unless your starting point is that the person we
are talking about is somehow not a human being.
It is impossible in the time allowed to give you a complete history, let
alone a picture of guardianship, but I want to fully convey several things in
order to give you a flavor of issues that arise in surrogate decision-making.
One of the things that I would like us to do nationally and internationally is to
get away from the notion of guardianship, with all that the term implies, and
talk about surrogate decision-making. That is, who would assist the person to
make certain kinds of decisions, trying to be loyal toward ideas and attitudes
that the person has.
Guardianship is one kind of intervention, and it should be the last resort.
Court ordered intervention in decision-making is an important intervention,
and I believe it should only be used when other options are exhausted, like
having a friend or family member help you without a court order. Guardianship sometimes can be a positive thing and one of the reasons why it is a
difficult concept is because it has certain positive aspects, designed to protect a
person from exploitation.
One of the famous cases in the disability field relates to Philip Becker
who was a person with Down Syndrome in California who was institutionalized and whose parents had no real involvement with him. The doctors
needed to do an operation on him to close a hole in his heart, which is not
uncommon in people with Down Syndrome, but could not do it unless they
had consent of somebody who had the capacity to give consent, which Philip
did not. Phillip's parents refused to give consent because Phillip's mother was
quoted as saying, "I am not sure what will happen to Phillip after I die, and
because of that I will not prolong his life any longer than I would live." That
may sound cruel, but if you know people with disabilities you know there is
something very important about the concern of what will happen to your loved
one when you are gone. Social services have sold people a bill of goods that a
level of care and protection will be provided. We must have some understanding of Philip's parents' concern about what would happen to Philip. One
might have felt more sympathy if they visited Philip, but it was not pure
cruelty.
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Well, to make a very long story short, in his case a substitute guardian,
who expressed interest in his life and worked with him, was appointed guardian to give consent to the operation and it was performed. So it is fair to say
that the guardianship was helpful.
In 1975, in a right to rehabilitation lawsuit in Nebraska - I worked on
this case in the Justice Department's Civil Rights division - there was a consent decree between the Justice Department and the defendant. In a consent
decree that purported to provide guardianship as a possible protection for people who, when they turned eighteen, might have difficulty making decisions,
the state hospital in its infinite wisdom decided across-the-board to create
guardians for every person when they turned eighteen. The hospital made the
parents the guardians and said, unless you have become the guardian of your
adult child, you will have no say in their care. This statement was quite scary,
so you had a massive number of guardianships, including many people who
did not need to have guardians at all, under the guise of protecting their rights.
So here you have the other side of guardianship.
In the District of Columbia, where I live and work, I spend a great deal of
time dealing with people with mental retardation. A few months ago, there
was a story in the Washington Post about the guardian of a man in a group
home. This man happened to have some property. He had a house that had
been willed to him by his parents. When they died, the house came into his
possession, which meant that the guardian had control over it. The guardian
should have retained the house or sold it and given the proceeds to the ward.
However, the guardian fixed up the house and sold it to her relatives at quite a
good deal, engaging in a clear conflict of interest.
I can give you story after story of guardianship, good, bad, and indifferent
- but the point is that we have to look at why we have guardianship, why we
have intervention in people's decision-making, and what is the best way to
protect people without overprotecting them, let alone take advantage of them.
What are the basic principles that operate in this field, and how are we
doing both nationally and internationally? Well, the first basic principle is, I
think, obvious: Everybody has the right to be autonomous and have self-determination. "Everybody" includes people with mental disabilities, whether the
disability is mental illness or mental disability. The mere fact of being institutionalized, whether somebody is committed voluntarily or not, does not indicate any lack of decision-making capacity in and of itself. It may be linked or
may not, but it is a separate decision. You have to come back to a basic
starting point, which is, that unless we know otherwise we assume people can
make decisions by themselves.
When I say an autonomous, self-determined decision, I do not mean an
isolated decision. Just as you might make a decision to consult people you
love, so can people with disabilities. It does not have to be isolated decisionmaking. Sometimes when we are assessing capacity, we set impossible stan-
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dards, much the way that voting officials in the south in the 1960s made black
voter applications pas a literacy test.
Well, if a great number of people cannot pass the kind of test that we
design, the test may not be an appropriate test of capacity. To be able to give
meaningful consent and make decisions that have some validity, people with
disabilities need to have the cognitive and emotional capacity to make those
decisions. They also need information. You cannot make the decision unless
you know what underlies the decision.
Finally, the decision must be voluntary and free of coercion. To understand how coercion can sometimes be subtle, consider the so-called voluntary
commitment of people to state mental hospitals. In the United States you can
commit yourself voluntarily until you decide to leave. At that point, a petition
can be made to keep you there. You remain "voluntary" in the hospital only
so long as you do not contest your status.
When you do not have capacity, voluntariness, and information, you may
have a decision that may not reflect the true values of the person, and you need
to be aware of that. Not every decision requires the heavy hand of a formal
court-imposed guardianship. A common sense proposition is that the more
serious and intrusive the decision, the more due process is connected to that
decision. If the decision is whether to wear a gray or blue suit tomorrow, I
may be unable to make that decision, but I do not need a guardian appointed to
make it for me. I can struggle through the decision on my own. On the other
hand, decisions regarding medical intervention, where to live, or whether to
marry, are important. If a person does not have capacity, there may be need
for an alternative. As I said before, it is necessary to intervene with somebody
who does not have the capacity to make decisions.
Let's take away the decision-making capacity of the person only to the
extent necessary to do so. If it is not necessary, do not do it. When you have
somebody appointed as a surrogate, an alternative decision-maker, that person
has obligations, and one obligation is to actually consult with the person under
legal protection to see what the person wants. Just because you may not have
legal capacity does not mean that you do not have a thoughts about what you
want to do or not do.
One of the great problems with guardianship in the social care home is, as
we saw in 1997, that a number of guardians do not have contact with their
wards in the social care homes, and therefore, are not aware of their needs and
desires. They were appointed as guardians, admitted the wards, and then had
no further contact with them.
Secondly, particularly with people who may not have a say, the capacity
to communicate with non-verbal people is a problem. Clearly, there are some
people who have never expressed an opinion about something and have little
capacity with which to do so. But for the people who have expressed opinions
about particulars interventions or actions, one must strive to make the decision
they would make if they could. This is substituted judgment.
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When you have a guardianship and decide that you need this level of
intervention, which in many instances takes away legal rights, one must provide due process. So it should be a decision made by an independent decisionmaker, a judge or someone who is not beholden to some other entity. The
judge should hold a hearing. The person whose capacity is about to be taken
away needs to have a lawyer. That lawyer has to represent the person's legal
interests, and not what the lawyer thinks is best for the person. The person
needs to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses and all of the things
that happen in courts.
It is true, however, that even though some might think this is a mental
disability or medical treatment issue, it is not. It is a legal decision with legal
consequences, and if you need to do it you need to know that. Once you have
a decision you have to have an opportunity to appeal that because trial courts
do not always get it right and you need a way to appeal it, when you have a
guardianship. You have to periodically review that decision because capacity
is fluid, not all or nothing and not locked in stone. That somebody does not
have the capacity today does not mean they will not have it in a few years.
Hungary now has a five-year review process, 4 and I would like to know
how that has operated. My feeling is that in order for it to be a really good
process it would have to continue to place the burden of persuasion on the
party in need of guardianship. You do not assume a person needs continuation
of the guardianship. You assume that they do not, and place the burden on the
governmental authority.
The above attributes are some of the aspects of guardianship or surrogate
decision-making that one would want to take into account. How does Hungary stack up against these criteria today, and how did it stack up in 1997? I
have already alluded, and others have alluded to serious problems, in Hungary's system. Certainly one problem is that while a judge does make a determination as to whether a person needs a guardian, the judge does not select the
guardian, and does not set criteria for selecting the guardian. The guardian5
ship authority, a local governmental official makes these decisions.
When Eric Rosenthal and I were in Hungary in 1997, we met with some
people involved in the guardianship process. Actually, one local guardianship
authority was very honest with us. She said, this is a medical decision and I
will follow what the medical people tell me to do. That is not legal. That is
deferring essentially to medical judgment instead of making a legal determination. A judge would be much less likely to do that than somebody not legally
trained, so the judge does not establish criteria for the guardianship and has no
real ability, as I understand it, to truly assess afterwards whether somebody is
performing appropriately as the guardian. Is the guardian operating with a
4.

GABOR GOMBOS, ET AL., THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PATIENTS IN SOCIAL CARE HOMES FOR
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serious conflict of interest? Has the guardian neglected his or her ward, such
that he or she should be removed as guardian? Is the guardian advocating for
the persons' needs? The judge does not have the supervising authority over
the guardian appointed, and consequently if anybody is doing this, it is the
guardianship authority.
As I understand it, in Hungary eighty to ninety percent of the people in
special care homes are under limited or plenary guardianship and that is a very
high number. 6 I feel that the guardianships are appointed decidedly to place
the people in the social care homes and indeed some social care homes take
the position they will not accept a true voluntary request for placement and
will insist on the appointment of the guardian before they will admit the person "voluntarily." So it is really perverse to consider those admissions "voluntary." Why would anyone want to go to these homes voluntarily? You can
understand they might get services they do not get elsewhere, but they cannot
get those services without having a guardian. And when the guardian then has
no contact with the person or the social care home, the situation becomes
especially problematic.
When you see facilities themselves, if you have full guardianship, you are
not treated as a real person. You can't go into patient government, you can't
make complaints on your own to advocates if they are even available. 7 The
guardian needs to do it. But they are not there and their interest is opposed to
yours, so you will not get to have your concerns addressed.
There are other specific things about which obviously the other folks who
wrote the 2001 report are much knowledgeable. There is some statutory
movement in the guardianship laws. I have not seen the statutory language,
but the report indicates some developments regarding the purposes of plenary
and limited guardianships. If you have not changed the manner in which the
guardian is appointed, if you have not changed the commitment process and
the processes are not functioning, then you have essentially placed people in
involuntary circumstances. You have some very serious problems. These are
not problems that are unique to Hungary, Central or Eastern Europe, or anywhere. They are problems that are in New York state, the District of Columbia, you name it. Very few states have figured this out, although some states
are trying to. For example, some states have established public guardianships
with substantial safeguards.
I gather Judge Lerner-Wren was a public guardian at some point in Florida, and public guardians can be very good for people who do not have family
members to help them, and where the public guardian's caseload is manageable. But sometimes guardians are asked to do much too much and don't have
the background and training. So we have a lot of work to do in this area and I
6. Id. at 34 (in 22 of 52 psychiatric social care homes, all residents are under guardianship,
and the rate of guardianship was under eighty percent in only four homes); 46 (more than ninety
percent under guardianship).
7. Id. at 27, 30, 38, 46.
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think that in a sense what is encouraging about the Hungarian situation is that
both when I looked in 1997 and now there is nothing so distinct about their
process that would suggest that it is not amenable to the types of things that
human rights lawyers would look at domestically and internationally. We
have a lot of work to do and I am happy to be here to help participate in the
process.
Thank you very much.
MR. DUBINSKY: Thank you. We started with Fort Lauderdale. Elizabeth Shaver Duquette received her A.B. from Stanford University and her J.D.
from the University of Southern California. After law school, she clerked for
the Honorable Lynn N. Hughes of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas and then was a litigation associate in Chicago,
before moving to Frankfurt, Germany, where she served as foreign counsel for
Ptinder, Volhard, Weber and Axster. She also taught American trial law to
German law students at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe - University in Frankfurt. She later moved to London and taught evidence at Pepperdine University
School of Law's London campus. While in London, Ms. Duquette received
her L.L.M. from the London School of Economics and Political Science with a
concentration in European Union Law. She now teaches European Union Law
as an Adjunct Professor at DePaul University College of Law, Northwestern
School of Law, and the University of Chicago Law School.
Elizabeth Shaver Duquette.
D.

European Union Perspectives

PROFESSOR DUQUETTE*: Thank you. I am honored to be here and
thank you for sticking around after lunch.
The human rights of the mentally disabled. Can European Union Law
help? Can we help the mentally disabled in Europe?
Let me give a quick overview of the European Union. Essentially, it is
comprised of three pillars, the Union being the overarching body. The European Community, which was formed in 1958, is one of three communities in
the first pillar. Most of the laws we will be talking about today are actually
from the EC, not the EU. The second pillar addresses foreign policy issues
and has some provisions on human rights. The third pillar is not relevant for
our purposes so we will skip it. To break it down in very simple terms, the EU
is more of an intergovernmental body, whereas the EC is more akin to a rough
federation.
What are the relevant areas of European Union law that we will be looking at today? First, what existing EU law is out there and what is likely to
come? The second area is enlargement. Hungary's relationship with the EU
is governed by a Europe Agreement. There are two obligations they have
* Elizabeth Shaver Duquette received her A.B. from Stanford University and her J.D.
from the University of Southern California.
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under the agreement. One is to adopt all of the existing laws, treaties, and
general principles of the EU. The second thing Hungary has to do in order to
join the EU is harmonize their laws, which means all of Hungary's domestic
legislation must be consistent with, and not conflict with, EU law. This is a
huge, huge undertaking and it takes years for this process to be complete.
Hungary applied to join the EU in 1994, and its invitation for membership is
imminent, probably within the coming year or two. The third area is human
rights. In addition to specific provisions on the mentally disabled, what general protections are there in the area of human rights in EU law? The last
issue, which is a bit outside of the scope of this presentation, is the Council of
Europe. As we know, it created the European Convention on Human Rights,
as well as the European Court of Human Rights. The Council of Europe is
closely related to the EC, but it is an entirely separate body.
EU activity for the mentally disabled. One of the first reports to address
the human rights of the mentally disabled was the European Parliament Report
of 1992. It basically recommended Member State action benefiting the mentally disabled in the area of civil rights, education, training, employment, social security and care accommodations. The European Parliament said, "The
weak must be protected in a people's Europe. The yardstick for dealing with
the mentally handicapped must always be respect for human dignity." While
this report has no legal effect, it is a very good barometer of public opinion in
Europe. Therefore, the Council and the Commission are very sensitive to it.
In fact, this 1992 report was the instigator for later activity in the field of
mental disability rights law in the EU.
The second point is the Council Resolution of 1999 on the promotion of
mental health. I would like to point out that there is a whole area of public
health law in the EU that I will get to, but this resolution specifically targets
mental health, which is a pretty big thing for the European Community when
you consider that it started on economic principles alone. The Council Resolution basically invited the Member States to strengthen and promote policies
on mental health and then invited the Commission to incorporate mental health
in future actions on public health.
There are many Commission funded projects. One that I will bring up
occurred in February 2000, in the form of a working paper on how mental
health issues affect the young people of Europe. Looking at people under the
age of twenty-one, they found that fifteen to twenty-two percent of young
people suffered from some sort of mental disorder, and that number climbed
even higher in under-privileged and migrant populations. There are also Community action programs that I will skip over, but they generally focus on
health promotion, information, and training.
The recent activity in this field happened mostly in 2001. In July 2001,
there was a proposal adopted by the Council aiming to create a Community
action program in the area of public health. The Commissioner for Public
Health and Consumer Protection, David Byrne, addressed the importance of
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mental disability law to the public health area of EU law. He also made a very
interesting point that stress and depression are likely to be problems in societies of transition, which is every single applicant state to the European Union.
All of these countries that are trying to join are making massive changes to
their infrastructure and institutions and that will be stressful on the system and
the people themselves. He took special note of that point. In December of last
year, there was a Council conclusion on combating stress and depression-related problems, following the Commissioner's speech in October.
What are the future public health programs that we can expect to see? In
the European Community treaty is Article 152, which was a big coup for people in the area of public health, allowing direct community action in improving
public health, preventing human illnesses and disease, and obviating danger to
public health.
What does it mean? What people have interpreted it to mean is that it
actually creates the responsibility for all actors in the Parliament, Commission,
and Council to do whatever they can to improve not only public health, but
mental health, in all areas of EU activity. It is a huge goal and is likely to
generate a fair amount of legislation. So far, the Commission has responded to
this by creating a new public health program which will replace eight of these
Community action programs that are listed above there.
The three main areas of action that this overall public health program will
address are improving health information through comprehensive health monitoring and information systems, devising a plan on how to respond quickly to
health threats, and also developing strategies to combat health determinants.
Enlargement as a topic. Applicant states must respect human rights.
Hungary applied to join the EU in 1994. The treaty limits the right to apply to
those states that respect fundamental freedom and the rule of law, as well as
Article 6 rights, which embody rights spelled out in the European Convention
on Human Rights and the constitutional traditions of the Member States.
The Europe Agreement that I alluded to before. Again, the requirements
are the harmonization of laws and adopting the acquis communautaire. The
Commission's assessment of Hungary has been positive. After what we have
heard today, it is a mystery to me how the Commission can give Hungary high
marks in the area of human rights. The Commission obviously has not come
to conferences like this one where it learned how dire the Hungarian situation
is. Clearly, the Commission has a broader viewpoint and is not focusing specifically on the area of mental health.
The standards that the Commission uses to judge an applicant Member
State, to judge its progress, are set out in the Copenhagen Criteria. It provides
that membership requires that the candidate country achieve stability of the
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the
protection of minorities. The 1999 report, which is essentially part of this
evaluation process, gave Hungary kind of high marks, not great, but they were
doing okay. By the year 2000, they said Hungary achieved the stability of
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institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law and also that they
were adequately protecting fundamental human rights and freedoms. That is
problematic, I believe, after what we have heard today.
In September of 2000, the European Parliament issued another report on
public health as it affects the process of enlargement. So looking at enlargement specifically, how are the issues different than just public health in the EU
as it exists today? Parliament noted that psychiatric abuses under Communist
systems in applicant countries will necessitate extensive reform. The Parliament also suggested that the PHARE program, which is essentially a funding
mechanism for applicant countries, be more proactive in the public health
field. The Parliament suggested it needs more money to address public health
problems. The Parliament also wanted to make sure applicant countries like
Hungary are well aware of the new acquis communautaire that will evolve
from Article 152's mandate.
Now we turn to the area of human rights. As an applicant country, Hungary has rights and obligations under EU law. It has to respect EU law and
human rights law to begin the process and it needs to harmonize all of its own
laws too. Hungary must be aware of those human rights, which are in addition
to the legislation we already talked about.
We are now looking generally at human rights. How is somebody going
to apply human rights law in the EU context? Basically, there would be domestic legislation or a piece of EU legislation that allegedly violates the EU's
concept of human rights. You would argue that the challenged legislation violates your fundamental human rights that are guaranteed by the European
Union.
It is somewhat interesting to know how human rights law developed in
the European Community. Originally, there were no provisions for the protection of human rights. Human rights is not an objective of the European Community treaty. The European Court of Justice became involved and started to
recognize the general principle of human rights and turned to the European
Convention on Human Rights to try to define what those rights might be. The
ECJ also considered the constitutional traditions of the Member States.
Opinion 2/94 is very important. The Commission tried to get the EC to
accede to the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Court of
Justice shot it down because they said the EC lacked competence, lacked the
power, to do this because it was outside the scope of the powers conferred by
the EC treaty. Even though all the Member States are members of the Convention, the Commission thought it was important for the EC as a body to join,
but that did not happen. This is a reminder that the original purpose of the EC
treaty was economic in nature.
The Treaty on European Union offers more help. The general provisions,
the common provisions applying to all three pillars, expressly state that the
Union is founded on the principle of the development and respect for human
rights, individual freedom and the rule of law.
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The clause that I just mentioned is criticized as being non-effective because it is non-justiciable. However, there is another justiciable clause that
nullifies the earlier criticism. It states that the Union shall respect fundamental
rights as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. If a
Member State persistently violates concepts of fundamental freedom and
human rights, their rights as members of the Council can be denied. Essentially they will lose the right to vote on the Council, so there are some protections and it does give the European Court of Justice some jurisdiction over
rights in this area.
The second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, has one very
important clause on human rights. Article 11 defines one of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy objectives as being to develop and consolidate
democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms. This is an objective of it and it is geared toward a foreign policy
context. So you might wonder how that would ever be a part of foreign policy? We don't have to think as far back as Nazi Germany to see that it could
happen, that a state might systematically eliminate people that it thinks are
sub-human, like the mentally disabled, and call it a form of foreign policy.
This clause will not let that happen. A Member State cannot say this is outside
the scope of EU law because it is part of our foreign policy. So while it seems
that it could be ineffective because it has no apparent application, its existence
alone could prevent that sort of thing from occurring. But, actually, the Common Foreign and Security Policy has more intergovernmental than federal involvement, so its success remains to be seen.
The Council of Europe is highly successful and effective. This is debatable, but relative to EU law protection that you are going to get under EU
human rights law, you are currently better off with the Council of Europe and
its Court of Human Rights as well as the European Convention on Human
Rights.
The Convention talks about specific rights that you have. You don't have
to rely on a general principle of law. You actually look at the European Convention. You don't have to cage it in constitutional terms. There is no definitive list, really, in EU law as to what these fundamental human rights are.
However, we do have - and I skipped ahead a little bit - one thing, and it is
included in the yellow book, the second to last document - in Nice in December 2001, and it is called the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights, and it
sets out basic human rights. Civil, political, economic, and social rights of
European citizens come under the headings of dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity, citizen's rights, and justice. The charter reflects a desire to strengthen
human rights in the EU and make them more visible.
The European Union as it continues to grow realizes that it needs more of
a democratic base. The democratic deficit is a constant criticism against the
European Union. It has power, but in no way represents the people of Europe.
But, there are attempts through Parliament to try to create more of a people's
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Europe. Human rights, as we said earlier, is one area that the general population is interested in.
The charter's rights that are obviously relevant to the mentally disabled
include the right to dignity, the right to integrity of the person, rights against
torture, right to private family life, et cetera. However, the legal effect of this
charter is weak. It actually states in the charter that the charter does nothing to
change the powers of the European Community and nothing to change the
treaty itself. So right now the charter does nothing more than give us more to
talk about in the human rights field. However, the Commission anticipates
that this charter will become part of the European Community treaty. This
would give the charter more status immediately and possibly could provide a
legal basis for future legislation. Even though EU human rights law is quite
vague, Hungary is going to have to adopt the laws to the extent that they are
there.
Also, Hungary has a dual obligation to the European Convention on
Human Rights. As a member of the Council of Europe, Hungary has to follow
the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. But, they also
have a separate obligation as a Member State to respect those same provisions.
So, conceivably Hungary could do something atrocious and get kicked out of
the EU, but it still cannot ignore the European Convention of Human Rights
due to its continuing obligation as a member of the Council of Europe. They
have an obligation to respect the Convention principles both as an EC Member
State and as member of the Council of Europe.
In conclusion, let's look at EU law as a realistic tool for the protection of
the mentally disabled. It is not a great deal. Professor Gostin is quoted as
saying European Union law, while certainly relevant - and that is the most
positive characterization - does not offer the kind of adjudicative power on
mental health and human rights as does the Council of Europe.
So why am I here? What is the point of knowing the EU perspective on
this if there is something out there that is much stronger? The difference is
that the EU is changing. It is constantly changing to expand its powers and
constantly trying to press forward and trying to get broader areas of competence so that it can more pervasively affect European policy.
It could be that the European Union will leave the issue of human rights
to the European Court on Human Rights, but I don't think this is true. This
whole criticism existed at the time that the Treaty on European Union, with its
provisions on human rights, was adopted in 1993. The Charter of Fundamental Human Rights illustrates that the EU is increasingly more interested in
advancing human fights and is interested in making it more visible, and making it stronger.
The other opportunity that the EU has is that one of the criticisms of the
European Convention on Human Rights is that it creates a set of negative
obligations as to what the state may not do. What it may not do to infringe
someone's privacy does not create a positive right. A positive right to mental
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health can create a series of entitlements to treatment, education, and certain
levels of care. Those positive rights do not exist. The European Union has the
opportunity when it creates its public health program and delves into the area
of mental health law to actually create positive human rights. I don't think it
is something they will do immediately, but the groundwork is there.
So this change in attitude may lead to a change in action. The European
Commissioner for Public Health has stated that mental health is a priority in its
new health policy agenda. He is committed to ensuring that mental health
takes center stage in legislation and EU activity in the future. The mentally
disabled should receive appropriate psychiatric care and enjoy dignity. That
must be a constant goal of the European Union.
We will see how the EU's public health policy develops. It is new and
relies on the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights, so we will see where it
goes and hope that it provides the protection that the mentally disabled need.
Thank you.

